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Abstract
Kevin Scharp argues that the concept of truth is defective, and is therefore unable to 
play its intended role in natural language truth-conditional semantics. As such, for this 
theoretical purpose, Scharp constructs two replacements: ascending truth and descend-
ing truth. Scharp applies the resultant theory, AD semantics, to the liar sentence, 
thereby obtaining a novel solution to the liar paradox. The aim of the present paper is 
fourfold. First, I show that, contrary to Scharp’s claims, AD semantics in fact yields an 
inconsistency when applied to standard liar sentences. Second, I diagnose the problem: 
AD semantics mishandles negation. I propose an alternative treatment, resulting in what 
I call AD* semantics. Third, I show that AD* semantics gives Scharp the resources 
required to respond to an alleged revenge paradox that has been raised against his view. 
Finally, I argue that, these consequences notwithstanding, it remains unclear whether 
AD* semantics provides an adequate account of alethic paradoxes more generally.
1 Introduction
Kevin Scharp believes that many of our concepts are defective.1 He tells us that, 
sometimes, a concept’s defect may prevent it from playing its intended explana-
tory role in some field of inquiry. In such a case, Scharp recommends replacing the 
defective concept with something better suited to playing the relevant explanatory 
role.
In light of the liar and other alethic paradoxes, Scharp believes that our ordinary 
concept of truth, truth, is defective.2 In contrast, he deems the logical principles 
required to derive the paradoxes unproblematic. Scharp argues that truth’s defect 
prevents it from playing its intended explanatory role in truth-conditional, natural 
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language semantics: when we try to give truth-conditional semantic theories for 
fragments of natural languages that contain the resources to construct liar sentences, 
i.e. sentences of the form:
(1) Sentence (1) is not true,
we end up deriving contradictions. Scharp concludes that, for this theoretical pur-
pose, we should replace truth.
Scharp recommends that we approach the issue with the mindset of a concep-
tual engineer: we should replace truth with a team of newly engineered concepts, 
ascending truth and descending truth. The informal, guiding idea is twofold. 
Firstly, for each concept, we have only one direction of the unrestricted T-schema. 
Whenever “X” denotes the sentence replacing “p”:
If p, then X is ascending true.
If X is descending true, then p.
Secondly, the converses of these conditionals hold only for so-called safe sentences:
If X is safe, then: if X is ascending true, then p.
If X is safe, then: if p, then X is descending true.
It follows that a safe sentence is such that its ascending and descending truth values 
coincide. All other sentences are unsafe, and are both ascending true and descend-
ing false.3 (Given the principles above, no sentence can be both ascending false and 
descending true.) The concepts ascending truth and descending truth are formally 
introduced by an axiomatic theory, ADT, which I introduce in Sect. 2.
The concepts ascending truth and descending truth are designed to play the 
theoretical role traditionally played by truth in truth-conditional, natural language 
semantics, the dominant approach to the empirical study of linguistic meaning in 
natural languages.4 Scharp develops a variant of the approach, called AD seman-
tics. (To emphasise: AD semantics is an approach to the empirical study of mean-
ing in natural languages; it is not an intended interpretation of the formal theory 
ADT).5 Whereas, for each sentence of the object language, truth-conditional seman-
tic theories yield a biconditional that encodes a truth condition for that sentence, AD 
semantic theories yield both a biconditional encoding an ascending truth condition 
and a biconditional encoding a descending truth condition.
Developing AD semantics, Scharp provides an assessment-sensitive semantics for 
the English word “true”.6 The underlying idea is that, qua linguists, we can choose 
3 Throughout, I say that a sentence is ascending false just in case it is not ascending true, and descending 
false just in case it is not descending true.
4 Scharp emphasises this as the principal motivation for developing ascending truth and descending 
truth in his 2019.
5 For the intended interpretation of ADT, see Scharp (2013a: 178–187)
6 See especially Scharp (2013a, b).
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to interpret an ordinary utterance of “true” either as expressing ascending truth, or 
as expressing descending truth. Scharp claims that, either way, sentences such as 
(1) are found to be unsafe. In addition he claims that, whichever way we interpret an 
utterance of “true”, the reasoning involved in the liar paradox turns out to be invalid. 
Likewise for other alethic paradoxes, such as Curry’s paradox and Yablo’s paradox.7 
These findings constitute Scharp’s solution to the liar and other alethic paradoxes.
Scharp argues that this solution has a major advantage over its competitors: it 
does not even face a revenge paradox.8 That is, Scharp argues that the usual strate-
gies for constructing revenge sentences simply do not give rise to anything that the 
view cannot handle. Moreover, this is achieved without any expressive restrictions, 
without imposing an object/meta language distinction, and without endorsing a the-
ory of truth that implies that its own axioms are not true. If right, this is an impres-
sive result.
The aim of the present paper is fourfold. First, in Sect. 3, I show that, as it stands, 
AD semantics in fact does not yield the results Scharp claims: surprisingly, it yields 
an inconsistency even when applied to standard liar sentences. It follows that AD 
semantics is no advance on truth-conditional semantics, and directly undermines 
Scharp’s solution to the liar, AD semantics, and the principal theoretical motivation 
for ADT.
Second, in Sect. 4, on behalf of Scharp, I diagnose the problem. I argue that AD 
semantics mishandles negation, and show how to amend it accordingly. I call the 
resulting theory AD* semantics.
Third, in Sect. 5, I show that this result has an important consequence for Scharp: 
it gives him the resources required to respond to an alleged revenge paradox, which I 
raised in Pinder (2015). Using AD* semantics in place of AD semantics, the deriva-
tion of the revenge paradox is blocked, and we instead derive the intuitively correct 
result that the revenge sentence is unsafe.
Finally, in Sect. 6, I argue that, these consequences notwithstanding, it remains 
unclear whether AD* semantics provides an adequate account of alethic paradoxes 
more generally. AD* semantics, when combined with ADT, is stronger than ADT 
alone. The consequence is that, as things stand, there is no guarantee that AD* 
semantics can be consistently applied to ‘pathological’ sentences in general.
2  ADT and AD Semantics
ADT is a consistent, axiomatic theory expressed in first-order predicate logic 
(FOL).9 ADT consists of a list of twenty axiom schemas; I only introduce part of the 
theory herein.
7 See Scharp (2013a: 255f).
8 See Scharp (2013a, especially 271–273).




Let L be a first-order language consisting of: the logical connectives (~, ∨, ∧, →, 
↔); constants (a, b, …); -n-ary predicates (Pn, Qn, …) and functions (fn, gn, …); 
variables (x, y, …); quantifiers (∃, ∀); parentheses; three unary predicates (A, D, 
S); and a device (〈·〉) for forming names of sentences of L . The guiding idea behind 
ADT is initially captured by three axiom schemas. Where “ϕ” can be replaced by 
any sentence of L:
(A-In) ϕ → A〈ϕ〉
(D-Out) D〈ϕ〉 → ϕ
(S) S〈ϕ〉 ↔ (D〈ϕ〉 ∨ ~ A〈ϕ〉).
Each instance of the following is thus a simple theorem of ADT:
(A-Out) S〈ϕ〉 → (A〈ϕ〉 → ϕ)
(D-In) S〈ϕ〉 → (ϕ → D〈ϕ〉)
Traditional truth-theoretic rules for connectives, such as:
T〈ϕ〉 ↔  ~ T〈~ϕ〉
T〈ϕ∧ψ〉 ↔  (T〈ϕ〉 ∧ T〈ψ〉)
do not straightforwardly hold for ascending truth or descending truth. But ADT 
gives us various analogues, such as the following axiom schemas:
(M) D〈ϕ〉 ↔   ~A〈~ϕ〉
(∧-A) (A〈ϕ〉 ∧ A〈ψ〉) → A〈ϕ∧ψ〉
(∧-D) D〈ϕ∧ψ〉 → (D〈ϕ〉 ∧ D〈ψ〉)
For the full axiomatisation of ADT, see Scharp (2013a: 154).




where “λA” and “λD” are names of ~AλA and ~DλD respectively, are unsafe. That 
is, ~SλA and ~SλD are theorems of ADT. Ascending liars and descending liars are 
both ascending true and descending false.
ADT serves to formally introduce ascending truth and descending truth, which 
are engineered principally to play the central theoretical role in AD semantics. 
Recall that AD semantics is an approach to the empirical study of meaning in natu-
ral languages, developed to contain an assessment-relative semantics for “true”. AD 
semantics is divided into three parts, which I will call: an informal presemantic the-
ory, an axiomatic core semantic theory, and a semi-formal postsemantic theory.10 
Together, these theories allow us to derive biconditional ascending/descending truth 
conditions for utterances in natural language. I will sketch an AD semantic theory 
10 Here, Scharp draws on work by Predelli (2005). See Scharp (2013a: 207–215, 225–253).
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for the fragment of English that contains: “sentence (1)” as used in this article, i.e. 
as a name for the sentence
Sentence (1) is not true;
the predicates “true” and “written”; “not” and “and”; and the copula “is”. Call this 
fragment English-.
A presemantic theory takes a real-world utterance of natural language and provides 
formal representations of: the uttered sentence; and the relevant features of the context 
of utterance and assessment. The relevant features are represented by an index:
〈 w, t, d, s 〉
where w is the world of utterance, t is the time of utterance, d is the agent who 
performs the utterance, and s is the alethic standard. As we see below, an alethic 
standard encodes how “true” is to be interpreted. According to Scharp, the alethic 
standard is fixed not by the utterer, but by whoever is using the semantic theory 
(i.e. the theorist). As only the alethic standard is relevant in what follows, I omit the 
other constituents of indexes.
Our presemantic theory for English- will use  ε- to represent utterances in Eng-
lish-. ε- contains the following:
Individual constant: λ.
One-place predicates: T; W.
Logical connectives: ~; ∧.
And the syntactic rules for ε—are as follows:
For individual constant α and one-place predicate Γ, “Γα” is a sentence.
For sentences ϕ and ψ, “~ϕ” and “ϕ∧ψ” are sentences.
The informal presemantic theory might then be stated as follows:
Utterances in English- are represented in ε-, taking syntactic differences into 
account as appropriate, where: “λ” represents “sentence (1)”; “T” represents 
“is true”; “W” represents “is written”; “~” represents “not”; and “∧” represents 
“and”. When the assessor interprets “true” as an ascending truth predicate, the 
context of assessment is represented as “SA”; when she interprets “true” as a 
descending truth predicate, the context of assessment is represented as “SD”.
Thus, for example, our presemantic theory will represent “sentence (1) is written” as:
Wλ.
A core semantic theory is an axiomatic theory that yields semantic values for 
sentences of a formal language on the basis of their constituents and modes of com-
position. Our core semantic theory is formulated in a rich metalanguage of ε- that 
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contains the language of set theory. As AD semantic theories ultimately yield both 
ascending truth conditions and descending truth conditions, we need to distinguish 
between what we might call ascending semantic values (at alethic standard s), rep-
resented by the function A[[⋅]]
s
 , and descending semantic values (at alethic standard 
s), represented by the function D[[⋅]]
s
.11 As usual, the semantic values of individual 
constants are objects, the semantic values of predicates are sets of objects, and the 
semantic values of sentences are 1 or 0.
The core semantic theory for ε- defines the semantic value for λ thus:
(I) V [[λ]]
s
 = “sentence (1) is not true”
In AD semantics, the ascending and descending semantic values of a predicate “Γ” 
can in principle come apart: A[[ ]]
s
 is the set of objects that “Γ” is ascending-true of; 
and D[[ ]]
s
 is the set of objects that “Γ” is descending-true of.12 We can thus define 
the semantic value for W thus:
(II) A[[W]]
s
= {o : it’s ascending true that o is written}
(III) D[[W]]
s
 = {o : it’s descending true that o is written}
The semantic value for “T” is given relative to the alethic standard. The core seman-
tic theory treats “T” as expressing: ascending truth at SA; and descending truth 
at SD. Formally, Scharp achieves this via a shift in the language.13 Let English-A 
be the language obtained by replacing every instance of “true” in English- with 
“ascending true”; and let English-D be the language obtained by replacing every 
instance of “true” in English- with “descending true”. And, if o is a sentence of 
English-, let  oA and  oD be the corresponding sentences of English-A and English-D 
respectively. Then:
(IV) A[[T]]SA = {o : it’s ascending true that  oA is ascending true in English-A}
(V) A[[T]]SD = {o : it’s ascending true that  oD is descending true in English-D}
(VI) D[[T]]SA = {o : it’s descending true that  oA is ascending true in English-A}
(VII) D[[T]]SD = {o : it’s descending true that  oD is descending true in English-D}
Finally, the core semantic theory defines the semantic value of sentences recursively 
as follows. Where α is an individual constant, Γ a predicate, and ϕ and ψ sentences:
(VIII) V [[]]
s
= 1 iff  V [[]]
s





= 1  iff  V [[]]
s
= 0.
(X) V [[ ∧ ]]
s
= 1  iff  V [[]]
s
= 1 and V [[]]
s
= 1.
12 For Scharp’s discussion of predication, see his (2013a: 218–221).
13 See Scharp (2013a: 249).
11 This is my terminology, not Scharp’s. Rather than distinguishing ascending semantic values and 
descending semantic values, Scharp recursively defines truth-in-a-model relative to an alethic value 
parameter which can take ascending truth or descending truth as its value (2013a: 214–215). Formally, 




 as functions obtained by 
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For example, setting the alethic standard to SA, the core semantic theory yields the 
following biconditional for “Wλ”:
A[[Wλ]]
SA
= 1 iff A[[λ]]SA ∈ A[[W]]SA [By (VIII)]
iff “sentence (1) is not true” ∈ {o : it’s a-true that o is written} [By (I) and (II)]
Given that, as a matter of empirical fact, “sentence (1) is not true” is written, it 
straightforwardly follows from (A-In) that it is ascending true that that sentence is 
written.14 Thus, the right-hand side of the biconditional holds, and we can infer that 
A[[Wλ]]SA = 1.
Finally, a postsemantic theory is a semi-formal theory that translates the theo-
rems of the core semantic theory into an ascending and descending truth values for 
the original utterance. Our postsemantic theory may be stated thus:
An uttered sentence, p, is ascending true from a context of assessment iff: where 




An uttered sentence, p, is descending true from a context of assessment iff: where 




Thus, for each sentence of English-, we obtain both an ascending and a descend-
ing truth condition. Given that A[[Wλ]]SA = 1 , we can conclude that “sentence (1) is 
written” is ascending true from SA.
Scharp applies AD semantics to a fragment of English containing the liar para-
dox.15 To illustrate how he does this, let us apply our theory to (1). The presemantic 
theory will model (1) as:
~Tλ.
Scharp supposes (for concreteness) that we have selected the alethic standard SD. 
Scharp then notes that, in SD, “T” is interpreted as a descending truth predicate, and 
that descending liars, such as λD, are ascending true and descending false. He imme-
diately concludes that:







Given (2), the postsemantics straightforwardly tells us that: (1) is ascend-
ing true, and not descending true, from our context of assessment. That is, (1) is 
14 See Scharp (2013a: 170).
15 See Scharp (2013a: 247–256).
16 See the top of Scharp (2013a: 252)
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unsafe—intuitively, the right result. Scharp claims that, had we instead selected the 
alethic standard SA, “the results would have been the same” (2013a: 252).
3  Inconsistency
There is a striking feature of Scharp’s discussion. Despite developing substantive 
formal machinery, he only reasons informally when explicitly addressing the liar 
paradox. In particular, Scharp does not prove (2a, b), merely relying on an informal 
comparison to descending liars. Unfortunately, the details of AD semantics do not 
bear out the result.
As before, let us suppose that the presemantic theory models (1) as “~Tλ” and 
sets the alethic standard to SD. Now, consider what the semantic theory tells us 
about ~Tλ:
(3) V [[ ∼Tλ]]
SD
= 1 iff  V [[Tλ]]SD = 0 [By (IX)]
iff  V [[λ]]SD ∉ V [[T]]SD [By (VIII)]
Focusing on the descending semantic value, we thus have:
  iff  
From (I) and (VII), we can thus infer:
(4) D[[ ∼Tλ]]
SD
= 1 iff   “sentence (1) is not true” ∉
{o : it’s descending true that  oD is descending true in 
English-D}
Now, we can prove the right-hand side of (4). Recall, first, that  oD is the sen-
tence obtained from o when we replace every instance of “true” in English- with 
“descending true”. Such a replacement would transform (1) into a descending liar, 
namely a sentence of the form:
~DλD,
where “λD” denotes that very sentence. So, the right-hand side of (4) holds just in 
case it is not descending true that λD is descending true in English-D. We can thus 
treat the right-hand side of (4) as equivalent to the following sentence of L:
(5) ~D〈DλD〉
The following derivation of (5) is ADT-valid:
(i) │ D〈DλD〉 [Hypothesis, for reductio]
(ii) │ DλD [By (i), (D-Out)]
(iii) │ D〈 ~DλD〉 [By (ii), substitution]
(iv) │ ~ DλD [By (iii), (D-Out)]
(v) │ DλD ∧ ~ DλD [By (ii), (iv), conjunction introduction]
D[[ ∼Tλ]]
SD
= 1 D[[λ]]SD ∉
D[[T]]SD
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(vi) ~D〈DλD〉 [By (i)–(v), reductio ad absurdum]




The postsemantic theory thus yields the surprising result that, from SD, (1) is in fact 
descending true.
This result is troubling. It immediately follows that, from SD, (1) is safe—that the 
liar sentence is not ‘pathological’ after all. This immediately casts Scharp’s account 
into doubt.
More seriously, the result leads to a contradiction. To see how, notice first that 
my precise specification of English- was, in certain respects, incidental. I could 
have included “descending true” within English-; after all, I have been using that 
predicate throughout this paper, and we may wish to understand its semantics. 
Let us suppose that I did in fact do this, and that I included “D” in ε- to represent 
the predicate. What axioms should be added to the core semantic theory to reflect 
these changes? At first glance, one might suggest:
A[[D]]
s
= {o : it’s ascending true that o is descending true}
D[[D]]
s
= {o : it’s descending true that o is descending true}
However, this is not right: if a sentence o contains the word “true”, then how we 
evaluate o depends on which alethic standard is operating. Thus, we in fact need 
the following axioms:
(XI) A[[D]]SA = {o : it’s ascending true that  oA is descending true in English-A}
(XII) A[[D]]SD = {o : it’s ascending true that  oD is descending true in English-D}
(XIII) D[[D]]SA = {o : it’s descending true that  oA is descending true in English-A}
(XIV) D[[D]]SD = {o : it’s descending true that  oD is descending true in English-D}
Two points should be noted about this. Firstly, by comparing (XII) and (XIV) 
with (V) and (VII), we can see that, from SD, the semantic values of “D” and “T” 
are identical. Secondly, none of these amendments affect the result established 
above that, from SD, sentence (1) is descending true.
Let’s return to that result. From (A-In), it immediately follows that “sentence 
(1) is descending true” is ascending true from SD. But, on current suppositions, 
“sentence (1) is descending true” is a sentence of English-, represented in ε- by 
“Dλ”. So, by the postsemantic theory, it follows that A[[Dλ]]SD = 1. By the iden-
tity of the semantic values of “D” and “T” from SD, it follows that A[[Tλ]]SD = 1. 





17 So far as I am aware, there is no direct proof of this, analogous to the argument from (4) to (6) given 




By the postsemantic theory, it follows that “sentence (1) is not true” is ascending 
false from SD.
Pulling the above results together, it follows that, from SD:
(1) is ascending false and (1) is descending true.
This, however, is ruled out by (A-In) and (D-Out): if (1) is ascending false, it is 
also descending false; and if (1) is descending true, then it is also ascending true. 
When applied to liar sentences, then, AD semantics yields an inconsistency. As 
noted above, this directly undermines Scharp’s solution to the liar paradox, AD 
semantics, and the theoretical motivation for ADT.
4  Negation
These results are deeply puzzling. If ADT is consistent, and AD semantics interprets 
“T” as expressing ascending truth or descending truth, then we might naturally 
expect AD semantics to be consistent. So what is going on?
The problem, I contend, is (IX): Scharp’s recursive rule for negation. It will be 
helpful to bifurcate the rule as follows:
(IXA) A[[∼]]s = 1 iff A[[]]s = 0 .
(IXD) D[[∼]]s = 1 iff D[[]]s = 0 .
In the first instance, note that  (IXA) and  (IXD) are disanalogous to ADT: they imply 
that negating a sentence flips both its ascending semantic value (from 1 to 0 and vice 
versa), and its descending semantic value (from 1 to 0 and vice versa). This is not so 
in ADT generally. Recall:
(M) D〈ϕ〉 ↔ ~A〈~ϕ〉
Now, if 〈ϕ〉 is descending true, then it follows from (M) that 〈~ϕ〉 is ascending false, 
and thus by (A-In) and (D-Out) that 〈~ϕ〉 is descending false. So negation flips 
descending truths to descending falsehoods. But the converse does not hold. If 〈ϕ〉 
is descending false, we cannot automatically infer that 〈~ϕ〉 is descending true. We 
can infer that 〈~ϕ〉 is ascending true, but the descending truth of 〈~ϕ〉 only follows 
from this if 〈ϕ〉 is safe.18
As ADT is consistent, this immediately suggests that we should tweak  (IXA) and 
 (IXD) to bring them in line, as follows:
(IXA*) A[[∼]]s = 1 iff D[[]]s = 0 .
(IXD*) D[[∼]]s = 1 iff A[[]]s = 0 .
These axioms, at first glance, better preserve the dual nature of ascending and 
descending truth encoded by ADT. Certainly,  (IXA*) directly reflects (M). However, 
ADT does not, as it stands, include the axiom:
18 It can also be shown that, if 〈ϕ〉 is ascending false, then 〈∼ϕ〉 is ascending true. But, if 〈ϕ〉 is ascend-
ing true, then we can again only infer that 〈∼ϕ〉 is ascending false if 〈∼ϕ〉 is safe.
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(M*) ~D〈~ϕ〉 ↔ A〈ϕ〉.
Moreover, although (M*) is consistent with ADT,19 so far as I can see it is not a the-
orem of ADT.20 If this is right, then  (IXD*) does not directly reflect ADT. If Scharp 
intends AD semantics to cohere with ADT, he will ultimately need to include (M*) 
as an axiom of ADT.
Regardless, there are two good reasons to prefer  (IXA*) and  (IXD*) to (IX). The 
first is formal. Suppose we construct an AD semantic theory for some fragment of 
English, using the negation clauses  (IXA*) and  (IXD*). Assume that, when two sen-
tences in the fragment differ only in that one is the negation of the other, the prese-
mantic theory differs in their representation by including “~” at the front of the for-
mer. Given the postsemantic theory, we obtain the following from  (IXA*) to  (IXD*):
The negated sentence is ascending/descending true from s iff the un-negated sen-
tence is not descending/ascending true from s.
Assuming a fixed alethic standard, we can easily reformulate these in L:
A〈~ϕ〉 ↔ ~ D〈ϕ〉
D〈~ϕ〉 ↔ ~ A〈ϕ〉
which, of course, are equivalent to (M) and (M*) respectively. Thus, as (M) and (M*) are 
consistent with ADT, we can see that  (IXA*) and  (IXD*) are unproblematic.
The second reason to prefer  (IXA*) and  (IXD*) is philosophical. Suppose that 
〈ϕ〉 is unsafe: it is ascending true and descending false. Then, what should we 
think of 〈~ϕ〉? At face value, we might expect the negation of an unsafe sentence 
to also be unsafe: negating a ‘pathological’ sentence does not negate its ‘patho-





= 0 , then they entail that 〈~ϕ〉 is also unsafe (i.e. 
A[[∼]]
s
= 1 and D[[∼]]
s
= 0).
This is in stark contrast to  (IXA) and  (IXD). These axioms entail that, if 〈ϕ〉 is 
unsafe, then 〈~ϕ〉 is ascending false and descending true (i.e. A[[∼]]
s
= 0 and 
19 Bacon’s model of ADT straightforwardly satisfies (M*) as a direct consequence of Bacon’s definition 
of “A”. So we can consistently add (M*) to ADT. See Bacon (2019: 381f).
20 An anonymous reviewer notes that they were initially mislead by the following derivation: 
(i) D〈~ϕ〉 ↔ ~ A〈 ~ ~ϕ〉 [by (M)]
(ii) D〈~ϕ〉 ↔ ~ A〈ϕ〉 [by *]
(iii) ~D〈~ϕ〉 ↔ A〈ϕ〉 [logic]
However, as they note, the step from (i) to (ii) appears to be invalid in ADT. The following princi-
ple would justify the step:
(*) (ϕ ↔ ψ) ↔ (A〈ϕ〉 ↔ A〈ψ〉).
But, the reviewer points out, (*) is not valid according to ADT: just let ϕ be DλD and let ψ by 1 = 0. 
Even if we require ϕ and ψ to be logically equivalent, it is unclear that the resulting principle would hold 
in ADT: Scharp writes that it is an “essential feature of ADT” that “logically interdeducible sentences 





= 1)—an impossibility. This is precisely the problem that arose when we 
applied AD semantics to (1): the sentence “Tλ” is unsafe, so the rules for negation 
entail that “~Tλ” is ascending false and descending true.
Let us define AD* semantics to be an approach to the empirical study of meaning 
in natural language, differing from AD semantics only insofar as, whereas the latter 
governs negation with (IX), the former governs negation with  (IXA*) and  (IXD*). 
If we apply AD* semantics to (1), the presemantic theory will again represent (1) 
with ~Tλ. We can then derive the following:
(8) (a) A[[ ∼Tλ]]SD = 1 iff D[[Tλ]]SD = 0 [By  (IXA*)]
(b) D[[ ∼Tλ]]SD = 1 iff A[[Tλ]]SD = 0 [By  (IXD*)]
and subsequently:
(9) (a) A[[ ∼Tλ]]SD = 1 iff D[[λ]]SD ∉ D[[T]]SD [By (8a) and (VIII)]
(b) D[[ ∼Tλ]]SD = 1 iff A[[λ]]SD ∉ A[[T]]SD [By (8b) and (VIII)]
The right-hand side of (9a) is equivalent to the right-hand side of (4), which we 
proved above. So it follows from (9a) that A[[ ∼Tλ]]
SD
= 1, and thus from the post-
semantic theory that “sentence (1) is not true” is ascending true from SD.
Moreover, if we add (M*) to ADT as I have recommended, then we can show 
that the right-hand side of (9b) is false. We note that the right-hand side of (9b) is 
equivalent to the following sentence of L:
~A〈DλD〉,
which is easily shown to be false. Thus, it follows that D[[ ∼Tλ]]
SD
= 0 and, by the 
postsemantic theory, that “sentence (1) is not true” is descending false from SD.
From SD, then, it can be shown using AD* semantics that (1) is ascending true 
and descending false, and that (1) is thus unsafe. We obtain the same result from SA. 
When applied to the liar sentence, AD* semantics recovers the intuitively right result.
5  Revenge
AD* semantics also gives Scharp the resources to respond to a revenge paradox, 
which I introduced in Pinder (2015). I begin by reconstructing the revenge paradox.
The guiding idea is that, given AD semantics, one might ask of a given sentence 
whether it is true-from-some-context. Consider the sentence:
(10) Sentence (10) is not true-from-some-context.
Let us add “sentence (10)” and “true-from-some-context” to English-, and suppose 
that our presemantic theory represents them in ε- with “ρ” and “C” respectively. 
Thus, (10) is represented:
~Cρ.
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We then add the following rules to our core semantic theory21:
(XV) V [[ρ]]
s
 = “sentence (10) is not true-from-some-context”.
(XVI) A[[C]]
s
 = {o : it’s ascending true that  oA is ascending true from SA, or it’s 
ascending true that  oD is descending true from SD}
(XVII) D[[C]]
s
 = {o : it’s descending true that  oA is ascending true from SA, or it’s 
descending true that  oD is descending true from SD}
From here, using AD semantics, we can derive the following biconditionals:
(11) (a) A[[ ∼Cρ]]
s










Notice that “sentence (10) is not true-from-some-context” does not contain a truth 
predicate, so using (XV)–(XVII), we can infer:
A[[∼Cρ]]
s
= 1  iff it’s not ascending true that “sentence (10) is not true-from-
some-context” is ascending true from SA, and it’s not ascending 
true that “sentence (10) is not true-from-some-context” is descend-
ing true from SD
D[[∼Cρ]]
s
= 1  iff it’s not descending true that “sentence (10) is not true-from-
some-context” is ascending true from SA, and it’s not descending 
true that “sentence (10) is not true-from-some-context” is descend-
ing true from SD
By the postsemantic theory, we obtain the following ascending/descending truth 
conditions:
“Sentence (10) is not true-from-some-context” is ascending true from s iff
it’s not ascending true that “sentence (10) is not true-from-some-context” is 
ascending true from SA, and it’s not ascending true that “sentence (10) is not 
true- from-some-context” is descending true from SD.
“Sentence (10) is not true-from-some-context” is descending true from s iff
it’s not descending true that “sentence (10) is not true-from-some-context” is 
ascending true from SA, and it’s not descending true that “sentence (10) is not 
true- from-some-context” is descending true from SD.
We can translate these ascending/descending truth conditions into ADT as follows:
A〈 ~Cρ〉[·]  ↔  ~A〈A〈 ~ Cρ〉〉[SA] ∧ ~A〈D〈 ~Cρ〉〉[SD]
D〈 ~Cρ〉[·]  ↔   ~D〈A〈 ~ Cρ〉〉[SA] ∧ ~D〈D〈 ~Cρ〉〉[SD]
21 I change the notation from Pinder (2015), bringing it in line with the notation herein.
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where “ρ” is taken to be intersubstitutable with “〈 ~ Cρ〉” and the subscripts keep 
track of the alethic standard in operation.22 And, finally, simplifying these sentences 
by substituting “ρ” for “〈 ~ Cρ〉”, we obtain23:
(12) (a) Aρ[·]  ↔ ~A〈Aρ〉[SA] ∧ ~A〈Dρ〉[SD]
(b) Dρ[·]  ↔ ~D〈Aρ〉[SA] ∧ ~D〈Dρ〉[SD]
We need two additional results to derive the revenge paradox. The first is obtained 
with reasoning analogous to the above (which I omit for brevity):
(13) (a) A〈Cρ〉[·] ↔  A〈Aρ〉[SA] ∨ A〈Dρ〉[SD]
(b) D〈Cρ〉[·]  ↔  D〈Aρ〉[SA] ∨ D〈Dρ〉〉[SD].
The second is a corollary of (12): the ascending and descending truth values of the 
revenge sentence are context of assessment invariant. That is:
(14) (a) Aρ[SA]  ↔  Aρ[SD]
(b) Dρ[SA]  ↔  Dρ[SD]
Using these results, we can derive a contradiction.24 We first derive that ρ is not 
true-from-some-context:
(i) │ Aρ[SA] [Hypothesis, for reductio]
(ii) │ ~A〈Aρ〉[SA] [By (i), (12a →), ∧-elimination)
(iii) │ ~Aρ[SA] [By (ii), (A-In), modus tollens)
(iv) ~Aρ[SA] [By (i)–(iii), reductio ad absurdum]
(v)  ~Dρ[SA] [By (iv), (A-In), (D-Out), modus tollens]
(vi)  ~Dρ[SD] [By (v), (14b)]
(vii)  ~Aρ[SA] ∧ ~ Dρ[SD] [By (iv), (vi), ∧-introduction]
(viii)  ~(Aρ[SA] ∨ Dρ[SD])
From here, we derive that ρ is true-from-some-context:
(ix)  ~ A〈 ~Cρ〉[SA] [By (iv), substitution]
(x) D〈Cρ〉[SA] [By (ix), (M)]
(xi) D〈Aρ〉[SA] ∨ D〈Dρ〉[SD] [By (x), (13b →)]
(xii) Aρ[SA] ∨ Dρ[SD] [By (xi), (D-Out), disjunctive reasoning]
And, finally:
(xiii) ⊥ [By (viii) and (xii)]
Thus, AD semantics admits of a revenge paradox.
24 I have simplified the derivation from Pinder (2015) slightly.
22 I assume here that, given Scharp’s comments about his semantics for “true”, these subscripts 
should apply to whole terms, and should not iterate. Thus, using (D-Out), we can infer “Dρ[SD]” from 
“D〈Dρ〉[SD]”; and sentences such as “D〈Dρ[SA]〉[SD]” are not well-formed.
23 This substitution is explicitly permitted. See Scharp (2013a: 154).
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Aimed at AD* semantics, however, this derivation does not get off the ground. 
When deriving the ascending and descending truth conditions for ρ, we do not 
derive (11), but rather:
A[[∼Cρ]]
s










And thus, rather than (12), we obtain:
(15) (a) Aρ[·] ↔   ~D〈Aρ〉[SA] ∧ ~D〈Dρ〉[SD]
(b) Dρ[·] ↔   ~A〈Aρ〉[SA] ∧ ~A〈Dρ〉[SD]
As (12a) plays a pivotal role in the derivation of the contradiction—at step (ii)—this 
blocks my derivation of this revenge paradox. Moreover, we can use (15a, b) to 
prove that ρ is in fact unsafe. First, we can prove that ρ is ascending true from SA.
(i) │ ~Aρ[SA] [Hypothesis, for reductio]
(ii) │ D〈Aρ〉[SA] ∨ D〈Dρ〉[SD] [By (i), (15a)]
(iii) ││ D〈Aρ〉[SA] [Hypothesis, for reductio]
(iv) ││ Aρ[SA] [By (iii), (D-Out)]
(v) ││ Aρ[SA] ∧ ~Aρ[SA] [By (i), (iv)]
(vi) │ ~D〈Aρ〉[SA] [By (iii)–(vi), reductio ad absurdum]
(vii) │ D〈Dρ〉[SD] [By (ii), (vi), disjunctive syllogism]
(viii) │ Dρ[SD] [By (vii), (D-Out)]
(ix) │ ~A〈Aρ〉[SA] ∧ ~A〈Dρ〉[SD] [By (viii), (15b)]
(x) │ ~A〈Dρ〉[SD] [By (ix)]
(xi) │ ~Dρ[SD] [By (x), (A-In), modus tollens]
(xii) │ Dρ[SD] ∧ ~Dρ[SD] [By (viii), (xi)]
(xiii) Aρ[SA] [By (i)–(xii), reductio ad absurdum]
So ρ is ascending true from SA. Second, we can prove that ρ is descending false 
from SA.
(xiv) │ Dρ[SA] [Hypothesis, for reductio]
(xv) │ ~A〈Aρ〉[SA] ∧ ~A〈Dρ〉[SD] [By (xiv), (15b)]
(xvi) │ ~A〈Aρ〉[SA] [By (xv)]
(xvii) │ ~Aρ[SA] [By (xvi), (A-In), modus tollens]
(xviii) │ Dρ[SD] ∧ ~ Dρ[SD] [By (xvii), and (i)–(xii) above]
(xix) ~Dρ[SA] [By (xiv)–(xviii), reductio ad absurdum]
So ρ is descending false from SA. Finally, given that (15a, b) imply that ρ is context 
of assessment invariant, it also follows that ρ is ascending true and descending false 
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from SD. The upshot is that ρ is unsafe from both contexts of assessment—intui-
tively the right result.
All of this suggests that the revenge paradox presented in Pinder (2015) is, in 
fact, another symptom of AD semantics’ mishandling of negation. When we shift 
to AD* semantics, however, the problem appears to be resolved. As things stand, no 
revenge paradox has even been raised against AD* semantics.
6  Adequacy
Is AD* semantics consistent? Given that AD* semantics is an approach to natural 
language semantics, partially constituted by informal theories, the question is not 
well-posed. The threat of inconsistency only arises when we take AD* semantics to 
have consequences that we can reformulate in L , the language of ADT.
The basic threat derives from the axioms of the core semantic theory. On minimal 
assumptions about the presemantic and postsemantic theories, the core semantic the-
ory generates substantive results that we can reformulate in L . When we do this, there 
are two important threats to distinguish. First, we might find that the recursive clauses 
governing the connectives lead to results that are inconsistent with the axioms of ADT. 
This is essentially the problem that I highlighted in Sect. 4: the recursive clause (IX), 
when applied to unsafe sentences, yields results that, formulated in L , are inconsistent 
with (A-In) and (D-Out). Second, we might invent a new term that extends natural lan-
guage such that, when we formulate corresponding axioms in the core semantic the-
ory, we can obtain a theorem that, formulated in L , is inconsistent with ADT. This is 
essentially the problem I highlighted in Sect. 5: in Pinder (2015), I introduced the term 
“true-from-some-context”, motivating the axioms (XV)–(XVII), leading to ascending/
descending truth conditions that, reformulated in L , lead to contradiction.
Neither threat of inconsistency can be ruled out here. Firstly, it is unclear that the 
possibility of a revenge paradox could ever be ruled out. One might show that AD* 
semantics, when applied to some fragments of language, only yields results compati-
ble with ADT. But, as AD* semantics is an approach to the empirical study of mean-
ing in natural languages, and natural languages can always be extended with novel 
terms and concepts, there always remains the possibility of revenge. If we invent 
or discover a novel concept (such as truth-from-some-context), we are justified in 
formulating new axioms in our core semantic theory to govern a term that expresses 
that concept. If we can reverse engineer a concept to justify axioms that yield results 
that, when formulated in L , are inconsistent with ADT, we will find a revenge para-
dox. I do not know how to prove that such a project must be unsuccessful.
More interestingly, I cannot show that the recursive clauses governing connec-
tives are unproblematic, because the recursive definition outstrips ADT. I have 
already suggested that the second negation clause  (IXD*) outstrips ADT as it stands, 
as the latter appears not to include (M*) amongst its theorems. Another example is 
conjunction. Bifurcating (X) for ease, the core semantic theory gives us:
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(XA) A[[ ∧ ]]s = 1 iff A[[]]s = 1 and A[[]]s = 1.  
(XD) D[[ ∧ ]]s = 1 iff D[[]]s = 1 and D[[]]s = 1. 
In contrast, recall that the relevant axioms of ADT are:
(∧-A) (A〈ϕ〉 ∧ A〈ψ〉) → A〈ϕ∧ψ〉
(∧-D) D〈ϕ∧ψ〉 → (D〈ϕ〉 ∧ D〈ψ〉)
So, AD* semantics gives us biconditionals, only one direction of which are given 
by (∧-A) and (∧-D). Moreover, the converses of (∧-A) and (∧-D) are not valid in 
ADT.25 The same point applies mutatis mutandis to disjunction.26 And, while the 
core semantic theory governs the conditional thus:
V[[ → ]]
s
= 1   iff  if V[[]]
s
= 1 then V[[]]
s
= 1
there is no corresponding rule in ADT governing the conditional at all.27 So the 
recursive clauses governing the connectives in the core semantic theory significantly 
outstrip ADT.
What this shows is that AD* semantics, when combined with ADT, is much 
stronger than ADT alone. The immediate consequence is that, even putting revenge 
paradoxes aside, the consistency of ADT does not suffice to protect AD* semantics 
from the threat of inconsistency. Although AD* semantics seems to deal adequately 
with liar sentences such as (1), it remains possible that there are alethic paradoxes 
that AD* semantics cannot handle.
This raises an important difficulty for Scharp. The concepts ascending truth and 
descending truth have been designed to play the central theoretical role in AD* 
semantics. What the present discussion shows is that those concepts are not, as they 
stand, adequate for their intended task. Their role in AD* semantics demands more 
than is supplied by ADT. So Scharp needs either to strengthen ADT, or to weaken 
AD* semantics. The former option requires care, and there is no guarantee of success. 
As Bacon (2019: 383–385) has discussed, there are several ways that Scharp might 
seek to strengthen ADT, but the options are not all jointly compatible. It remains an 
open question whether Scharp can strengthen ADT sufficiently to support its role in 
AD* semantics, without leading to inconsistency. In contrast, it is unclear whether 
the latter option is even viable. For example, the additional strength of AD* seman-
tics derives in part from the fact that, where ADT has conditionals, AD* semantics 
25 In Bacon’s model of ADT, the interpretation of “D” is not closed under conjunction introduction. So 
we obtain a counterexample to the converse of (∧-D) by letting ϕ and ψ be different axioms of ADT; 
and to the converse of (∧-A) by letting ϕ and ψ be the negations of different axioms of ADT. See Bacon 
(2019: 381–382, 386).
26 See Scharp (2013a: 154, 248).
27 As it stands, this axiom does lead to results that are inconsistent with ADT. This can be demonstrated 
by considering a sentence of the form: 
 (16)  If sentence (16) is descending true, then sentence (16) is not descending true.
(I omit the details.) As Scharp does not discuss conditionals, however, I assume that this constitutes 
future research, and so I will not push the point here.
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has biconditionals. But having biconditionals is non-negotiable: if AD* semantics is 
to be a viable approach to natural language semantics, it must yield conditions neces-
sary and sufficient for the ascending/descending truth of each sentence in the relevant 
fragment of natural language. Such conditions are expressed with biconditionals.
The upshot is this. Even if AD* semantics can deal adequately with the liar par-
adox and my earlier revenge paradox, it remains unclear whether AD* semantics 
deals adequately with alethic paradoxes more generally. The underlying problem 
is that the concepts ascending truth and descending truth are not, as they stand, 
adequate to play the central theoretical role in AD* semantics—and that it is unclear 
whether those concepts can be further developed to make them adequate for this 
theoretical role. As things stand, the consistency of ascending truth and descending 
truth does not guarantee that AD* semantics can be consistently applied to ‘patho-
logical’ sentences in general.28
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